Through an acquaintance, I was able to have a conversation with Judge Hong, who was first appointed as an Interim Civil Court Judge in 2007, serving in the Criminal Court.

Q. When sentencing defendants for misdemeanors such as drug possession or theft, what factors do you consider most heavily? Specifically, to what extent does the defendant’s financial situation play a role?

Judge Hong placed significant emphasis on recidivism and criminal history as primary factors in sentencing decisions. He provided a clear contrast in his approach: defendants with “no record” would likely see their cases dismissed entirely, while those with repeat offenses were “most likely going to get some time.” This suggests he operates on a graduated system where first-time offenders receive considerably more leniency than repeat offenders.

The judge also mentioned considering “the crime” itself, indicating that the nature and severity of the offense played a role alongside criminal history. He referenced broader policy considerations as well, noting how in New York City, prosecutors’ decisions not to prosecute certain crimes (like subway fare evasion) had led to increased problems with “mentally ill people in the subways, more homeless in the subways,” and people being “afraid to take the subways.” This suggests he considers the broader social impact and deterrent effect of his sentencing decisions.

Judge Hong was quite explicit that the defendant’s financial situation played essentially no role in his sentencing decisions. He stated categorically that “the overwhelming majority of people who commit crime are poor,” indicating this is such a universal condition among defendants that it does not serve as a distinguishing factor in his decision-making process.

When I brought up the intergenerational effects of monetary sanctions on marginalized families, he acknowledged the validity of my concern, agreeing, “that’s absolutely true.” However, he then explained that in his New York City context, there is an underlying assumption that if someone can afford to live in the city, they “must have the money” to meet basic financial obligations. This suggests he operates under the presumption that defendants have some baseline financial capacity, even if limited.

The judge’s approach appears to deliberately avoid using financial status as a sentencing factor, possibly as a way to ensure equal treatment regardless of economic background.

Q. Do you ever see cases where a defendant’s inability to pay fines or fees leads to harsher sentencing outcomes?

Judge Hong suggested this scenario was rare in his practice, but his explanation revealed the structural constraints that prevent this from being a major issue. He clarified that fines are only imposed “if it’s mandated by law, which means we don’t have any choice.” He provided the specific example of DWI cases where “you must pay $200 fine” as a legislative requirement, not a judicial decision.

This systematic approach appears designed to prevent the very problem I was asking about. When judges do have discretionary authority over financial penalties, Judge Hong indicated they exercise restraint, stating, “we’re not going to give you something” that would create undue hardship. This suggests a conscious effort to avoid creating situations where defendants face jail time solely due to their inability to pay discretionary fines.

The judge’s response implies that the legal framework in his jurisdiction has been structured to minimize wealth-based disparities in sentencing outcomes. By limiting fines to legislatively mandated situations and exercising judicial discretion cautiously when it comes to financial penalties, the system appears designed to prevent the criminalization of poverty that occurs in some other jurisdictions.

However, it is worth noting that the judge did not address whether defendants sometimes end up serving time for failure to pay those mandated monetary sanctions, which could still create the disparity I am exploring—just at a different stage of the process.

Q. Some jurisdictions use alternative sentencing options like drug courts, community service, or diversion programs. How often do you use these alternatives, and do financial barriers prevent defendants from completing them?

Judge Hong indicated that alternative sentencing options were regularly available and utilized in his court. He specifically mentioned drug treatment programs, stating these were offered as alternatives to incarceration. The way he described offering defendants choices between treatment and jail time suggests alternatives were routinely part of his sentencing toolkit.

He also referenced “alternatives to incarceration” more broadly, suggesting there was a systematic approach to providing options beyond traditional jail sentences. This aligns with broader criminal justice reform efforts to reduce incarceration rates and address underlying issues that contribute to criminal behavior.

Judge Hong made a particularly interesting observation that financial constraints were not the main barrier preventing defendants from successfully completing alternative programs. Instead, he identified what he called “emotional barriers” as the primary challenge.

He illustrated this with a specific example that reveals defendant psychology: when offered a choice between “strong treatment for one year” or “jail for 10 days,” many defendants chose the jail option. His explanation for this counterintuitive choice was that defendants “would rather just go to jail” because they could “come back out” quickly, whereas treatment programs required sustained commitment and lifestyle changes.

This suggests that even when financial barriers are removed, defendants may still resist alternative programs due to factors like:

• Fear of long-term commitment

• Skepticism about treatment effectiveness

• Preference for certainty (known jail time) over uncertainty (treatment outcomes)

• Possible shame or stigma associated with admitting need for treatment

• Simple avoidance of the hard work required for behavioral change

The judge’s observation challenges assumptions that financial accessibility is the primary barrier to alternative program success, suggesting that motivation and psychological readiness may be more significant factors.

Q. In your experience, do financial obligations tied to sentencing, such as fines or probation fees, contribute to recidivism?

Judge Hong demonstrated awareness of the intergenerational effects of monetary sanctions, acknowledging how financial penalties can “put heavy pressure on the convicted person’s family.” When I described how fines and fees imposed “without too much consideration of that person’s background” can harm marginalized families, he agreed this was “absolutely true.”

He confirmed that these intergenerational effects were “happening” in his jurisdiction, suggesting he had observed cases where financial penalties imposed on defendants created hardship for their families. This acknowledgment indicates that despite his efforts to minimize financial considerations in sentencing, the broader system still generates these cascading economic effects.

However, the judge did not provide extensive detail about how directly he believes these financial pressures contribute to recidivism rates. His acknowledgment seems more focused on recognizing the social harm these policies can cause rather than drawing direct causal connections to repeat offenses.

The judge’s overall approach appears to be shaped by an awareness of these issues—his reluctance to impose discretionary fines and his focus on alternatives to incarceration may represent strategies to minimize the financial pressures that could contribute to the cycle of poverty and crime.

His comment about the assumption that New York City residents “must have the money” suggests he may underestimate the financial stress his defendants face, even as he tries to structure his sentencing to avoid exacerbating those pressures. This tension between awareness of systemic issues and practical assumptions about the defendant’s capacity represents an interesting aspect of judicial decision-making in urban courts.